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## National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

26 January 1982

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


	Top Secret
ents	
Poland: Jaruzelski's Program	
Ethiopia: Offensive in Eritre	ea 5
USSR-Italy: Attack on Italian	n Communist Leadership 6
Turkey: Pessimism About Elimi	inating Terrorism 7
Tanzania-USSR: Deterioration	in Relations 8
Kampuchea: Coalition Proposati	l Rejected 9
Bolivia: Economic Pressures	9
Madagascar: Alleged Coup Atte	empt 10
India: Antartic Expedition .	
_	e
ial Analysis	

25X1

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OLAND: Jaruzelski's Program	
Premier Jaruzelski in his speech defended the decision to impose martial trictions would be eased by the end of the remains calm.	law and claimed that re-
Jaruzelski said some restrict of fect in key industries. He assof people interned has declined a still in custody will be released alty oaths promising not to resumptivities. He indicated that Policial proceed at their own pace in law.	serted that the number and implied that those only if they sign loy-me "antisocialist" ac- sh military authorities
The population was reassured to return to the previous highly system. Jaruzelski reaffirmed histor economic reform, laid out measining the bureaucracy, and pledgall. He criticized the US sanctichat the US adopt a more realistic destern countries who resisted presions.	centralized, corrupt s government's support ssures aimed at stream- ged "social justice" for ons, expressed hope c policy, and applauded
oureaucratic reform and greater of skeptical ears. Poles often hear of the government to reform itself, party and government bureaucracies	have heard promises by only to see entrenched es fail to carry out such that only Solidarity had
dilitary Activity	



Top Secret	25X
ETHIOPIA: Offensive in Eritrea	
//The government is continuing preparations for its largest offensive against the Eritrean secessionists in two years, but its efforts probably will be little more successful than previous ones.//	25X
//Chairman Mengistu believes the time is right to try to end the 20-year rebellion by military force. He is convinced the guerrillas are seriously weakened by internecine fighting and Sudanese restrictions on their activity.//	25X
//Addis Ababa is able to concentrate its attention on the north because it has the upper hand over Somali insurgents in the Ogaden. The Army has committed three additional divisions—including one shifted from the Ogaden—and the Air Force has moved MIG-23 fighter—bombers and MI-24 helicopter gunships to the airbase at Asmara for the offensive. The Army also has begun limited sweep operations, and some skirmishes with rebel forces have already occurred.//	25X
Comment: //Even though Soviet advisers probably again are on the scene, Addis Ababa's forces will be hampered by low morale, an inefficient logistic system, and vulnerable supply lines.//	25X
//The guerrillas, who have withstood previous attacks, have had ample time to prepare for the offensive. Moreover, insurgents in adjoining Tigre Province are aiding the Eritrean guerrillas. Even if the Ethiopians capture the remaining rebel-held town of Nakfaa symbolic objective of the offensivethe guerrillas will be able to hold on to most of the countryside.//	25X
//Although the offensive will place new burdens on the economy, failure to break the rebellion would have few significant internal repercussions. Mengistu has involved key military officials in the offensive, and he would have little trouble finding scapegoats for another failure.//	25X
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5

Top Secret	25X
USSR-ITALY: Attack on Italian Communist Leadership	
Moscow's sweeping condemnation of the Italian Communist Party leadership falls short of "excommunication."	25X
The Soviets, in an editorial on Sunday in Pravda, accused party leaders of using events in Poland as a pretext for "inadmissible and unjust denigration" of the achievements of "socialism." The article contended that the leadership's "opportunistic and revisionist" stance represents a renunciation of the party's links with the socialist vanguard.	25X
Comment: Moscow apparently decided that the criticisms by the Italian party leaders had become intolerable at a time when the USSR was already on the defensive because of Western reaction to events in Poland. The editorial's tone also indicates that the leadership had struck a sensitive nerve by questioning the viability of Soviet-style "socialism" at a time of economic difficulties in the USSR.	25X
The article does not, however, match the past harsh Soviet criticism of the Chinese party or equal the Cominform's expulsion of the Yugoslav party in 1948. By carefully differentiating between the Italian party's leadership and the rank and file, Moscow intends to galvanize its supporters in the party into effective opposition to the leadership.	25 <b>X</b>
Party Chief Berlinguer and Central Committee dissident Cossutta will each seek to use Moscow's broadside to woo the 25 percent or more of the rank and file that traditionally leans toward Moscow. Berlinguer is likely to respond today that the attack proves the Soviets are not able to carry on a dialogue based on "equality and mutual respect." He may even argue that Moscow's attitude in this instance is symptomatic of the malaise that set the stage for the problems in Poland. Cossutta, on the other hand, probably hopes to rally a large enough	
following to force his colleagues to adopt a position more in tune with the Soviets.	25X

TURKEY: Pessimism About Eradicating Terrorism  //The military government evidently has made little progress toward eradicating terrorism, and its tough efforts to reduce extremist activity could contribute to the deterioration of Ankara's relations with Western Europe.//	25X 25X
	25X
//Meanwhile, the imprisonment of large numbers of suspectsabout 30,000 so farand the slow pace of mass trials involving seemingly undemocratic procedures have strengthened the impression in Western Europe that the generals are a repressive regime.//  Comment: //Turkish military and civilian aurhorities	25X
have claimed consistently that they have broken the terrorist movement and are on the verge of eliminating it in the large cities.	25X 25X
//West European criticism of the military government will come to the fore during the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly this week, when continued Turkish membership in the Council of Ministers will be debated. The condemnation of Tureky last week by the European Parliament—the EC's assembly—probably will not have a major impact on the Council's debate. The vote was close and taken with few members present, so that the majority for the resolution represented only 13 percent of the membership.//	25X
//Immediate expulsion of Turkey from the Council appears unlikely because some members apparently prefer to continue efforts to influence the Turks from within the Council. Denmark and possibly other West European countries, however, proably will bring charges of human rights violations against Ankara in the European Commission of Human Rights.//	25X
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TANZANIA-USSR: Deterioration in Relations	
//Tanzanian officials are concerned over recent tempts—aimed at increasing their presence in Data Salaam—to skirt immigration procedures to bring incresonnel than their limited aid program warrants. The control of the sale	r es n more Fric- Soviet f some n addi- , the Moscow, ecent ributed
Comment: //Despite these problems, Tanzania will continue to rely on the Soviets for military	
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KAMPUCHEA: Coalition Proposal Rejected	
Democratic Kampuchean leaders yested rejected the two-month-old proposal by Soloose coalition among the three major Kampuchea sugged groups meet again to try to establish a ment based on the principles that emerged a series of tripartite talks. Two key proposed significant coalition decisions.	Singapore for a ampuchean resist- ested that the coalition govern- ed last fall from principles are
Comment: Democratic Kampuchea remassubordinate itself to another political larly when its guerrilla forces provide tive resistance in Kampuchea. By requestalks, Democratic Kampuchea is trying to breakdown in negotiations. Such a development of Democratic Kampuchea and coulgroup's hold on its seat at the UN.	entity, particu- the only effec- sting further avoid a complete copment would its political
BOLIVIA: Economic Pressures	
The Torrelio government has failed of its debt rescheduling agreement, but bankers have granted a third waiver to a country into default. Bolivia has until implement economic austerity measures the IMF requirements for financial assistance to the constant of the control of th	international avoid pushing the 15 April to nat will satisfy ce. President has been unsuc- eal for funds to
Comment: Torrelio is leery of the quences of a new economic program. Some advisers fear that several suggested rem to the country's economic woes. Others that opponents of the regime would try texpected popular resistance to the measure.	e of his economic nedies could add are concerned to capitalize on

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MADAGASCAR: Alleged Coup	Attempt		
The Malagasy Governme had put down a South Afric eral high-ranking military leaders reportedly have be  Comment: It is not y has actually taken place.	an - backed co officers and en arrested.	oup attempt. some church	Sev-
nas accuarry taken prace.	The	arrosts may	y bo
related to a communique is November that was highly communing food shortages, the conflict between the Coivil unrest likely and proplets against President Range	sued by Cathol ritical of the simmering stud hurch and the ovide fertile	e government dent unrest, state make : ground for o	in • and renewed

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INDIA: Antarctic Expedition	
The first Indian scientific expedition to Antarct reportedly has reached the continent in the Norwegian claim area. The expedition consists of Indian scientiwho will conduct research in glaciology, magnetism, se mology, meteorology, and oceanography.	sts
Comment: The expedition, which apparently is und Norwegian sponsorship, is the first of its kind by a developing Third World nation. The Indians seem to ha apstaged the Chinese, who may undertake a similar expetion in 1983.	ve
CHINA: Industrial Performance	
The State Statistical Bureau reports that industrial production rose 4 percent in 1981. The Bureau's initial data showed light industrial output rising 13. percent, which more than offset a 4.5-percent decline in heavy industry.	
Comment: Overall industrial growth exceeded the government's modest target of 3 percent, which anticipated the falloff in heavy industry. Economic policie favoring light industry and production of consumer goo contributed to an 8-percent drop in heavy industrial production through July, and as late as November, Beij	s ds

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11

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
NATO - WARSAW PACT: MBFR Talks	<i>t</i>
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//The Soviets recently proposed the creation of a working group to draft points of agreement at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. They probably believe this offer, while not giving new life to the negotiations that resumed on Thursday, will complement other Soviet "peace" proposals and support Moscow's ostensible commitment to the full range of arms control negotiations.//	25X1
//As spokesmen for the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets are seeking to counter Western proposals and put the West on the defensive. Their latest proposal follows two earlier initiatives by the East in 1980.//	25 <b>X</b> 1
//For several years, Eastern negotiators have refused to satisfy the West on longstanding disputes. These include the East-West disparity in numbers for Eastern ground force strength in Central Europe, and the nature and scope of notification and verification measures of troop reductions made by each side in that area.//	25 <b>X</b> 1
The Coming Round	
//The East is likely to reiterate past arguments on these issues and not offer compromises. Eastern negotiators want to assess the outcome of the US review of MBFR strategy before they offer any new substantive approaches.//	25X1
//The East's representatives realize that Western acceptance of the latest proposal is unlikely. They evidently hope, however, that it and previous Eastern proposals will urge the West to make the next move.//	25X1
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//Uncertainty over Poland and the CSCE review session in Madrid probably will reinforce Soviet resistance to making any concessions now. The USSR would be reluctant to accept the constraints any MBFR accord structured along current Western lines would impose on its military forces until Soviet leaders are sure that additional Soviet troops will not be needed in Poland. Moreover, as long as European confidence-building measures encompassing Soviet territory are at issue in CSCE, Moscow	
will continue to reject Western MBFR notification and verification proposals.//	25
Moscow's Options	
//The Eastern proposal to begin drafting points of agreement in MBFR will be used to strengthen the "peace" offensive in Europe. The USSR might reinforce this offensive with renewed emphasis on its proposals to freeze NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strength in Central Europe while MBFR talks continue and to limit conventional armaments in any eventual accord.//	25
//In addition, the Soviets have expressed a vague willingness to include "short-range" nuclear weapons in MBFR negotiations. If this proposal is publicized, it would complement President Brezhnev's earlier offer regarding a moratorium on introducing additional INF systems in Europe.//	25
//This latest MBFR proposal shows Moscow's need to deal with European fears of conventional arms inferiority at a time when NATO and the US are contending that new Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles are upsetting the European nuclear balance. It also offers an opportunity to demonstrate that the USSR is prepared to negotiate across the full range of arms control initiatives.//	25

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